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Abstract
Data from a recent ﬁeld experiment suggests that diﬀerences in participation rates are respon-
sible for much of the variations in revenues across formats in charity auctions. We provide a
theoretical framework for the analysis of this, and other related, results. The model illustrates
t h el i m i t so fp r e v i o u s" ﬁxed N" results and introduces some new considerations to the choice
of auction mechanism. It also implies, however, that the data cannot be explained in terms of
participation costs alone: there must exist mechanism-speciﬁc obstacles to participation.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
From the small town silent auction that raises a few hundred dollars to the $70 million Robin Hood
annual beneﬁt in New York City (Anderson 2007), charities and non-proﬁts often use auctions to
transform donations in kind into cash. The choice of format constitutes a diﬃcult decision problem,
however, even under idealized circumstances: if all bidders, win or lose, derive some beneﬁtf r o m
monies raised, revenue equivalence does not hold, even if valuations of the object itself are private
and independent.1 Until recently, however, and despite an otherwise vibrant literature on the
economics of auctions, little attention had been devoted to the properties, theoretical or otherwise,
of charity auctions.
The best known result is perhaps Goeree et al’s (2005) theorem, that when the standard (SIPV,
or single object, independent private values) framework is extended so that all bidders receive some
revenue proportional beneﬁt, lotteries and winner-pay auctions produce less expected revenue than
all-pay auctions. The intuition, as they characterize it, is that bids are suppressed under winner-pay
mechanisms because when one bidder tops the others, she may win the object, but she also loses the
chance to free ride on the beneﬁts associated with the best of the other bids. While there are few,
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1This characteristic is not unique to charity auctions: Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) counts Amish estate sales and
buyer ring knockouts as examples of auctions with what he calls "price proportional beneﬁts."
1if any, examples of all-pay charity auctions, their result seems to rationalize the widespread use of
raﬄes and lotteries, both ineﬃcient variations on the all-pay theme. Engers and McManus (2006)
have since shown that if bidders who contribute experience an additional "warm glow" (Andreoni
1995), the superiority of the all-pay over both ﬁrst-price and second-price winner pay mechanisms
survives in the limit, as the number of bidders increases.
Two recent lab experiments would seem to support this result. Davis et al (2006) ﬁnd that
lotteries raise more revenue than English auctions, while Goeree and Schram (2003) conclude that
lotteries do worse than all-pay auctions but better than ﬁrst price auctions. Our point of departure,
however, is Carpenter, Holmes and Matthews (2006), one of the few ﬁeld experiments on charity
auctions, which reaches more or less the opposite conclusion, namely, that the all-pay mechanism
produces no more revenue, in a statistical sense, than the second price sealed bid, and that both
produce less revenue the ﬁrst price sealed bid. As an empirical matter, the reversal owes much to
diﬀerences in participation rates across mechanisms. While the model in Goeree et al (2005) and
the designs in Goeree and Schram (2003) and Davis et al (2006) assume a ﬁxed number of bidders
- so that the separation of potential bidders into active and inactive bidders, a critical distinction in
this paper, isn’t relevant - the results in Carpenter, Holmes and Matthews (2006) indicate that the
ratio of active to potential bidders, or the participation rate, is lower in second price than ﬁrst price
sealed bid auctions, and lower still in all-pay auctions.
The immediate purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical framework for the analysis of
these, and perhaps other, empirical observations on charity auctions. Such a framework should allow
us to ask, for example, whether the existence of some sort of participation cost, and therefore an
endogenous number of active bidders, is suﬃcient per se to reverse the ordering in Goeree et al (2005),
or whether this requires mechanism-speciﬁcd i ﬀerences in costs. That is, is endogenous participation
enough, on its own, to explain the underperformance of the all-pay auctions in Carpenter, Holmes
and Matthews (2006), or should we conclude that the costs of participation in all-pay auctions are
higher, either because bids are more diﬃcult to calculate or bidders do not like the mechanism?
The next section derives the optimal symmetric bid and expected revenue functions for the ﬁrst
price, second price and all-pay sealed bid SIPV auctions in which all bidders, active or otherwise,
earn a beneﬁt that is proportional to revenue, and those who contribute to the charity (one bidder in
winner-pay auctions, and all active bidders in all-pay auctions) experience a warm glow proportional
to their bids, in an environment in which the submission of a bid imposes some cost on bidders. This
representation of the participation problem owes much to the recent work of Menezes and Monteiro
(2000) and, much earlier, Samuelson (1985).
2In the third section, we explore the properties of these bid and revenue functions, both within
and across mechanisms, a more complicated task than ﬁrst seems. From Menezes and Monteiro
(2000), for example, we know that in the absence of revenue proportional beneﬁts, the introduction
of participation costs does not overturn revenue equivalence but can cause this still common revenue
function to exhibit some unusual behavior: it need not be the case, for example, that expected
revenue rises with the number of potential bidders, or that in the limit, it is independent of the
distribution of private values. From Engers and McManus (2006), on the other hand, we learn
that even without participation costs, there is no ﬁxed order of revenues for small - that is, low
N - auctions. To cultivate a sense of what properties are, and are not, usual, we calculate and
plot numerical bid and revenue functions for several members of the Kumaraswamy (1980) family
of bounded value distributions.
2 Optimal Bids and Expected Revenues
2.1 General Framework
There are N ≥ 2 potential risk neutral bidders whose private values for some indivisible object can
be modeled as independent draws from some continuously diﬀerentiable distribution function F over
the unit interval [0,1]. These values are known to bidders before the decision to participate (or not)
must be made. Auction revenues are used to provide a service from which all bidders, active or
iinactive, beneﬁt: as in Goeree et al (2005), the value to each bidder is a constant fraction 0 ≤ α<1
of these revenues. Some active bidders will also experience a "warm glow" (Andreoni 1995; Engers
and McManus 2006) equal to a fraction 0 ≤ γ<1−α of their own contribution to auction revenue.
The limit on γ, needed to ensure that each bidder’s optimization problem is well-deﬁned, implies
that β = α + γ, the sum of the common return and warm glow, is also less than one.
Following Samuelson (1985) and, more recently, Menezes and Monteiro (2000), potential bidders
confront some cost of participation 0 ≤ cj < 1, j = f(irst price),s(econd price),a(ll pay),t h e
value of which could be mechanism-speciﬁc. As a result, the number of active bidders is not
predetermined. Samuelson (1985) and others deﬁne this cost in terms of the resources committed
to "bid preparation," but on the basis of recent experimental evidence from both the lab and the
ﬁeld (Carpenter, Holmes and Matthews 2006, 2007), a broader deﬁnition is warranted, one that
allows bidders to hold "intrinsic preferences" over mechanisms.
Within this framework, the derivation of optimal bid functions draws heavily on both Menezes
and Monteiro (2000) and Engers and McManus (2006). In particular, symmetric Bayes-Nash
3equilibria are identiﬁed for bid functions σj(vi) that are assumed (for the moment, at least) to be
diﬀerentiable above some participation threshold 0 ≤ v < 1.
2.2 First Price Sealed Bid
The representative bidder must decide whether or not to participate and, if she does, what type b v
to announce or, equivalently, what bid σf(v b) to submit. To this end, consider ﬁrst the conditions
under which someone with the private value v ≥ v will ﬁnd it optimal to reveal her true type when
the participation threshold v is assumed ﬁxed. With likelihood C






)!q!, she will compete with M other bidders for the object and, conditional on
M ≥ 1,t h eﬁrst order statistic of their values (that is, the maximum) has the distribution function
G(x,M)=( F(x)−F(v))M/(1−F(v))M If M =0 , there will of course be no rivals and, therefore,
no ﬁrst order statistic. The conditional return on the bid σf(v b) for ﬁxed M ≥ 1 is then:
Z b v Z v ¯
EU(v,v,M b )= (v − (1 − β)σf(v b))g(x,M)dx + α σf(x)g(x,M)dx (1)
v b v
where g(x,M)=dG(x,M)/dx = M(F(x) − F(v))M−1f(x)/(1 − F(v))M is the conditional density
function of the ﬁrst order statistic. The ﬁrst term in (1) represents the bidder’s expected return
when she wins the auction - because she earns both the common return ασf(v b) on her bid and
experiences the warm glow γσf(v b) in this case, her "net bid" is (1−(α+γ))σf(v b)=( 1−β)σf(v b) -
while the second term is the expected beneﬁt that still accrues to her when she loses.
It follows that the unconditional expected return, EU(b v,v),w i l lb e :
EU(v,v b )=F(v)N−1(v − (1 − β)σf(v b))
+
PN−1 C
N−1F(v)N−1−M(1 − F(v))MEU(b v,v,M) M=1 M
= F(v)N−1(v − (1 − β)σf(v b)) (2)

















N−1F(v)N−1−MM (F(x) − F(v))M−1f(x)σf(x)dx M=1 M
v b
after substitution for G(x,M) and g(x,M),w h e r et h eﬁrst term on the right hand side of each
equality is the expected return in the case where there are no other bidders, and the last equality
follows from the fact that
R b v g(x,M)=( F(v b)−F(v))M/(1−F(v))M and that, as a consequence of v
the binomial theorem,
PN−1 C
N−1F(v)N−1−M(F(v b) − F(v))M = F(b v)N−1 − F(v)N−1. M=1 M
4The derivative of EU(b v is therefore: v,v) with respect to the bidder’s choice variable b
∂EU(b v,v)
∂b v
= −(1 − β)F(b v)N−1dσf(b v)
db v





M MF(v)N−1−M(F(b v) − F(v))M−1
= −(1 − β)F(b v)N−1dσf(b v)
db v
+( N − 1)F(b v)N−2f(b v)(v − (1 − β)σf(b v))
−α(N − 1)F(b v)N−2f(b v)σf(b v)
where the second line follows from a corollary of the binomial theorem,
PN−1 C
N−1MF(v)N−1−M(F(b M=1 M v)−
v,v) F(v))M−1 =( N − 1)F(v)N−2.T h e ﬁrst order condition for a SBNE is that
∂EU(b =0at v b = v, ∂v b
which leads, after some simpliﬁcation, to the ﬁrst order diﬀerential equation:
dσf(v)
+
(N − 1)(1 − γ) f(v)
σf(v)=
(N − 1) f(v)
v (4)
dv (1 − β) F(v) (1 − β) F(v)
While (4) is not exact, there exists an integrating factor, F(v)θ,w h e r eθ =














F(x)θ−1f(x)xdx + k (6)
where k is a constant of integration. Because the optimal threshold bid, σf(v), and therefore the
product σf(v)F(v)θ, are both zero, it follows that2 :
Z
σf(v)=
N − 1 1
v
F(x)θ−1f(x)xdx (7)
(1 − β) F(v)θ
v














Inasmuch as the participation threshold is not predetermined, however, the optimal bid function
(8) is not a reduced form. To this end, recall that the revenue proportional beneﬁts of the auction
are not conditional on participation, and observe that a potential bidder with private value v should
be indiﬀerent between participation (and the submission of a zero bid) and non-participation. If such
a bidder does participate, the likelihood that she will win the auction is F(v)N−1,i nw h i c hc a s es h e
2In Engers and McManus (2006), the optimal bid at the "threshold" - in their case, the lower limit on the compact
support of F - is indeterminate. The diﬀerence is that, in their case, the likelihood that a bidder with the threshold
value wins the auction is zero.
5receives a beneﬁt equal to her private value v. (Since σf(v)=0 , there is neither a common return
nor a warm glow.) With likelihood C
N−1F(v)(N−1)−M(1 − F(v))M, on the other hand, she will M
lose the auction to one of M ≥ 1 other bidders, but receive a beneﬁtt h a ti se q u a lt oaf r a c t i o nα of






g(x,M)σf(x)dx − cf (9) M M=1 v




N−1F(v)(N−1)−M(1 − F(v))M g(x,M)σf(x)dx (10) M M=1 v
since the externalities that other bidders produce are not limited to participants. The "threshold
bidder" is therefore someone for whom:
F(v)N−1v = cf (11)
This condition deﬁnes an implicit function in which the participation threshold v depends on
the costs of participation cf, the number of potential bidders N and, implicitly, the shape of the
distribution function F(v).I f t h e e ﬀects of the ﬁrst are more or less predictable - if potential bidders
have better outside options, fewer of them will participate - the implications of the second are more
subtle and call for some comment. As the number of potential bidders increases, so, too, does
the likelihood that a particular active bidder will lose whatever she has "invested" in the auction
which, in turn, causes the threshold to rise. It is then not obvious that an increase in the number
of potential bidders or, if one prefers, auction size, will always lead to an increase in the expected
number of active bidders and, so, expected revenue.
It is important to note, however, that this participation eﬀect is not t h er e s u l to fs o m ei n c r e a s e d
desire to free ride on the contributions of other bidders. The threshold v in (11) does not depend
on either the common return α or warm glow γ: it is the same condition, in fact, that Menezes and
Monteiro (2002) derive for their "no spillover" model. The reason is that non-participants beneﬁt
from these spillovers, too.
Charities will be less interested in bid functions and their properties than expected revenue Rf
and, to this end, we note that since the density function of the ﬁrst order statistic for all N private
values is NF(v)N−1f(v), Rf will be equal to:
6Z 1
Rf = N F(v)N−1f(v)σf(v)dv (12)
vf(cf,N)
where the threshold value is written vf(cf,N) as a reminder that the lower limit is not ﬁx e di nt h e
usual sense.
2.3 Second Price Sealed Bid Auction
The derivation of the SBNE bid and expected revenue functions in the second price auction calls
for the introduction of another distribution function, J(x,M), the conditional distribution of the






























It will also be useful to note that the likelihood that a bidder who announces type v b is the runner-up
is:









(1 − F(v))M (14)
since it is her bid, σs(v b), that determines the winner’s payment.
With this in mind, with likelihood F(v)N−1,w h e r ev once more denotes the relevant participation
threshold, the representative bidder will have no active competitors. If it is assumed that in an
auction with one bidder, the "second price" is zero, then such a bidder would earn a beneﬁto fv,n o
matter what bid σs(v b) she submits.
With likelihood (N − 1)F(v)N−2(1 − F(v)), on the other hand, she will compete with just one
other bidder (M =1 ), with expected beneﬁts equal to:
Z b v
EU(v,v, b 1) = (v − (1 − β)σs(x))g(x,1)dx +
(1 − F(v b))
ασs(v b)
(1 − F(v)) v
Z v b 1 (1 − F(v b))
=
(1 − F(v))




The ﬁrst term is the (conditional on M =1 ) expected beneﬁt when she wins - the diﬀerence between
this term and its equivalent under the ﬁrst price mechanism is that the relevant bid is now σs(x)
rather than σs(v b) - and the second captures the fact that w h e ns h el o s e s ,t h ev a l u eo fh e rb i d ,σs(v b),
determines the winner’s payment and therefore the value of the common beneﬁt.
Finally, she will face M ≥ 2 competitors with likelihood C





(v − (1 − β)σs(x))g(x,M)dx
+
M(F(b v) − F(v))M−1(1 − F(b v))










M(M − 1)(F(x) − F(v))M−2(1 − F(x))f(x)
(1 − F(v))M (17)
is the density function of the second order statistic. As before, the ﬁrst and second terms represent,
respectively, the expected beneﬁts when she wins, and when she loses but submits the second highest
bid. The additional third term measures the direct spillover when she is neither the ﬁrst nor second
price bidder.
With some simpliﬁcation, the unconditional return EU(v,v b) c a nt h e nb ew r i t t e n :
Z b v
EU(v,v b)=F(v)N−1v +( N − 1)F(v)N−2 (v − (1 − β)σs(x))f(x)dx
v










N−1F(v)N−1−MM (v − (1 − β)σs(x))(F(x) − F(v)M−1f(x)dx M M=2 v
+α(1 − F(b v))σs(v b)
XN−1
C




N−1M(M − 1)F(v)N−1−M σs(x)(F(x) − F(v))M−2(1 − F(x))f(x)dx M M=2 b v
The eﬀects of variation in v b on EU(v,v b) are a little easier to calculate than ﬁrst seem be-
cause the derivatives of the ﬁfth and sixth terms each contain, with opposite signs, the term
α(1 − F(v b))σs(b v)
PN−1 C
N−1M(M − 1) F(v)N−1−M(F(v b) − F(v))M−2f(v b). It follows that: M=2 M
∂EU(v,v b)
=( N − 1)F(v)N−2(v − (1 − β)σs(v b))f(v b)
∂v b
+α(N − 1)F(v)N−2[(1 − F(v b))
dσs(v b)
− σs(b v)f(v b)] (19)
dv b
+(v − (1 − α)σs(v b))f(v b)
XN−1
MF(v)N−1−M(F(v b) − F(v))M−1
M=2
+α[(1 − F(v b))
dσs(v b)
− f(v b)σs(v b)]
XN−1
MF(v)N−1−M(F(v b) − F(v))M−1
dv b M=2
PN−1 The observation that, as a further consequence of the binomial theorem, M=2 MF(v)N−1−M(F(v b)−
F(v))M−1 =( N − 1)(F(v b)N−2 − F(v)N−2), and the requirement that ∂EU(v,v b)/∂v b =0at v = v b
8in equilibrium leads, after considerable simpliﬁcation, to:
(v − (1 − β)σs(v))f(v)+α[(1 − F(v))
dσs(v)
− f(v)σs(v)] = 0 (20)
dv
or, if v =1   and α =0   ,t oa n o t h e rﬁrst order diﬀerential equation3:
dσs(v) (1 − γ) f(v) 1 f(v)
dv
−
α (1 − F(v))
σs(v)=−
α (1 − F(v))
v (21)





















where k is the constant of integration.
The choice of boundary condition, and therefore the calculation of k, is complicated for two
reasons. The optimal threshold bid σs(v) is, for reasons noted earlier, indeterminate, but the
derivation of (23) assumed that v =1 . The second problem can be circumvented if the domain of  
α α (1 − F(v))
1−γ
σs(v) is (re)extended such that (1 − F(1))
1−γ
σs(1) assumes its limit value of 0. It
then follows that:
Z 1








Integration by parts then implies:
Z 1
α α











1 − γ 1 − γ v
1−γ
or, if one assumes, once more, that v  =1 , so that both sides can be divided by (1 − F(v)) α :




(1 − γ)(1 − F(v))
1−γ
v
(1 − F(x)) α dx (26)
α
The limit bids σs(v) and σs(1) are then chosen so that σs(v) is continuous over the entire interval
[v,1].
It isn’t diﬃcult to infer from (26) that, conditional on participation, neither the introduction
of spillover eﬀects nor participation costs causes bidders to become "N sensitive." This should
not come as much of a surprise, however, because Menezes and Monteiro (2002) show that it is
3I ft h e r ei sn oc o m m o nr e t u r n-t h a ti s ,i fα =0- then (20) collapses to σs(v)=( 1− γ)−1v,av a r i a t i o no nt h e
standard proposition that in a second price auction with independent private values, individuals will bid these values.
In this case, individuals bid γ(1 − γ)−1 percent more than their values because it is possible, at least in principle,
that there remains a warm glow γ.
9(still) dominant to bid one’s value in the absence of the former, while Engers and McManus (2006)
determine that in a second price charity auction with a ﬁxed number of bidders, the optimal bid is
independent of N.
Menezes and Monteiro (2002) also found, however, that the participation thresholds for ﬁrst
and second price auctions were equal, a result that is not robust with respect to the presence of
a common return. To understand the diﬀerence, consider, once more, the situation faced by the
"threshold bidder." If she participates, then with likelihood F(v)N−1 she alone will submit a bid,
and therefore win the object worth v to her at a cost of 0, since there is no second price. With
likelihood (N −1)F(v)N−2(1−F(v)), on the other hand, there will be a second bidder, someone who
will (almost certainly) win at a cost of σs(v), which produces a beneﬁto fασs(v) to the threshold
bidder. Last, with likelihood C
N−1F(v)N−M−1(1 − F(v))M,t h e r ew i l lb eM ≥ 2 other active M
bidders, and with no chance that the threshold bidder will determine the second price, the expected
beneﬁts that will accrue to her are α
PN−1 C
N−1F(v)N−M−1(1−F(v))M R 1 j(x,M)σs(x)dx,w h e r e ,
Z 1
M=2 M
as deﬁned earlier, j(x,M) is the conditional density of the second order statistic.
of participation are therefore:
v
The net beneﬁts




N−1F(v)N−M−1(1 − F(v))M j(x,M)σs(x)dx − c M M=2 v
If, on the other hand, the threshold bidder does not participate, she receives 0 with likelihood
F(v)N−1 +( N − 1)F(v)N−2(1 − F(v)), the likelihood that one or fewer bids are submitted, since
R 1 there are no revenue proportional beneﬁts in this case, and α v j(x,M)σs(x)dx with likelihood
C
N−1F(v)N−M−1(1 − F(v))M for M ≥ 2. The net beneﬁts of non-participation are therefore: M
XN−1 Z 1
α C
N−1F(v)N−M−1(1 − F(v))M j(x,M)σs(x)dx M M=2 v
The condition that deﬁnes the threshold v is therefore:
s F(v)N−1v + α(N − 1)F(v)N−2(1 − F(v))σs(v)=c (28)
the solution of which will be denoted vs = vs(N,cs,α).R e l a t i v e t o t h e ﬁrst price threshold (11),
two related properties of vs(N,cs,α) call for attention. First, the threshold is now sensitive to the
common return α and warm glow γ = β−α associated with the charity. Second, when participation
costs are the same, cf = cs, the threshold is lower or, if one prefers, participation rates are higher,
in the second price auction. A comparison of the two conditions (11) and (28) reveals that the
10diﬀerence is the term α(N − 1)F(v)N−2(1 − F(v))σs(v), the beneﬁtt h a ta c c r u e st oat h r e s h o l d
bidder in second price auction when there is just one other bidder, and she determines the winner’s
payment.
Expected revenues in the second price auction Rs are therefore:
Z 1













Z 1 Z 1 !
1−γ
+ F(x)N−2(1 − F(x)) (1 − F(z)) α dz dx)
vs(N,cs,α,β) x
where N(N − 1)F(v)N−2(1 − F(v))f(v) is the unconditional density function of the second order
statistic and the second line follows from substitution for σs(x).
2.4 All-Pay Sealed Bid Auction
The derivation of the SBNE bid functions under the all-pay mechanism follows now familiar lines.
With likelihood F(v)N−1, the representative bidder will have no active rivals, and can expect (v −
(1 − β)σa(v b)). With likelihood C
N−1F(v)N−1−M(1 − F(v))M, she will have M ≥ 1 rivals, and M
expect:
Z v b αM
Z 1
EU(ˆ v,v,M)= vg(x,M)dx +
(1 − F(v))
f(x)σa(x)dx − (1 − β)σa(v b) (30)
v v
(F(v b) − F(v))M αM
Z 1
=
(1 − F(v))M v +
(1 − F(v))
f(x)σa(x)dx − (1 − β)σa(v b)
v
The ﬁrst term reﬂects the fact that she will win the auction, and receive her private value v,w i t h
likelihood G(b The second and third follow from the observation that, win or lose, she will v,M).
f o r f e i tt h en e tc o s to fh e rb i d ,(1 − β)σa(b v), but obtain beneﬁts equal to a fraction α of the sum of
all other bids, expressed here as the product of the number of active bidders M and the mean bid
R 1 f(x) σa(x)dx. Substitution for g(x,M) in the ﬁrst term and integration then leads to the v (1−F(v))
second line.
After some simpliﬁcation, the unconditional payoﬀ EU(v,v ˆ) for a bidder who assumes type v ˆ is
therefore:























N−1MF(v)N−1−M(1− M=1 M M=1 M
F(v))M =( N − 1)(1 − F(v)), a n dt h e nn o t i n gt h a t
PN−1 C
N−1F(v)N−1−M(F(b v) − F(v))M = M=1 M
F(v b)N−1 − F(v)N−1:
EU(v,v ˆ)=F(v)N−1(v − (1 − β)σa(v b)) + v(F(v b)N−1 − F(v)N−1)
Z 1
+α(N − 1) σa(x)f(x)dx − (1 − β)(1 − F(v)N−1)σa(v b) (32)
v
Z 1
= F(v b)N−1v + α(N − 1) σa(x)f(x)dx − (1 − β)σa(b v)
v
The derivative of EU(v,v ˆ) with respect to v ˆ is therefore just v(N −1)F(v b)N−2f(v b)−(1−β)
dσa(v b), dv b
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F(v)N−2f(v)v + k (34)
1 − β
where k is a constant of integration. Since it is optimal for bidders with threshold values to bid
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σa(v)= vF(v)N−1 − vF(v)N−1 F(x)N−1dx (36)
If the costs of participation in ﬁrst price and all-pay auctions are the same, then so, too, are
the participation thresholds.4 To show this, recall that with likelihood F(v)N−1,t h et h r e s h o l d
bidder will be the lone participant, and win a prize worth v to her for a bid of 0. With likelihood
C
N−1F(v)N−1−M(1 − F(v))M, there will be M ≥ 1 other bidders, each of whom will submit, in M
R 1 R 1 expectation, a bid equal to v σa(x)f(x)dx, which produces a beneﬁte q u a lt oαM v σa(x)f(x)dx
for the threshold bidder. The net beneﬁts of participation are therefore:
XN−1 Z 1
a F(v)N−1v + α C
N−1F(v)N−1−M(1 − F(v))MM σa(x)f(x)dx − c (37) M M=1 v
The net beneﬁts of non-participation, on the other hand, are:
4If costs are the same across all three mechanisms, then, participation will be lower in both the ﬁrst price and






σa(x)f(x)dx (38) M M=1 v
since, with likelihood C
N−1F(v)N−1−M(1−F(v))M, there will be M ≥ 1 other bidders who produce M
R 1 t h es a m en o n - e x c l u s i v eb e n e ﬁto fαM v σa(x)f(x)dx. The threshold is therefore deﬁned by:
a F(v)N−1v = c (39)
the solution of which is denoted va = va(N,ca).
The same demonstration also shows that expected revenues under the all-pay mechanism are
equal to:
Z 1
Ra = N σa(v)f(v)dv (40)
va(N,ca)
3 Comparison of Mechanisms
3.1 Numerical Analysis and the Kumaraswamy Distribution
We observed, in the introduction, that there is no ﬁxed order for the three mechanisms. This
does not mean, however, that the mechanisms are without "common properties" that should inform
both research and practice. To determine whether such properties exist, we shall compare numerical
participation, bid and revenue functions when the distribution of private values over the unit interval
is a member of the Kumaraswamy (1980) family:
F(v|a,b)=1− (1 − xa)b a,b > 0 (41)
with mean bΓ(1 + a
1)Γ(b)/Γ(1 + a
1 + b). Much of the discussion that follows will focus on the four
particular examples with the implied density functions depicted in Figure 1: F(v|1,1), the standard
uniform distribution with mean 0.50, and a benchmark in the literature; F(v|2,2), which has almost
the same mean as the uniform distribution (0.53) but is hump-shaped, the equivalent of an auction
in which few "extreme bidders" should be expected; F(v|3,1), with mean 0.25, which produces
auctions with an expected preponderance of "low value bidders"; and F(v |1,5),w i t hm e a n0.83,
which instead leads to auctions with a disproportionate number of "high value bidders."
3.2 Threshold Values and Participation Rates
We have shown that the threshold values under the ﬁrst price and all-pay mechanisms are equal,
and Table 1 reports the values of this common threshold and the implied non-participation rates
13as the auction size or number of potential bidders N and participation cost c vary for each of the
four distributions of private values. One of the most immediate implications of this data is how
much even small participation costs inﬂuence behavior. When the distribution of private values
is bell-shaped, for example, the diﬀerence between c =0 , or costless participation, and c =0 .01,
1 1 in which costs are just 50th of the mean private value, or 100th of the maximum private value,
is the diﬀerence between no threshold and one that is equal to 0.46 in the N =5case. From
another perspective, there is now an almost 1 percent chance (0.0079 = (0.38)5) chance that no one
will submit a bid, despite the fact that there are few low value bidders. In practical terms, small
obstacles to participation under either mechanism can drive numerous (potential) bidders from the
auction.
Furthermore, in small auctions, even a small increase in the number of potential bidders induces a
substantial increase in the threshold. In the uniform case when c =0 .01, for example, the threshold
rises from 0.10 to 0.40 as N increases from 2 to 5,a n dw h e nN =2 0 ,w h i c h ,f o rm o s tp u r p o s e s ,i s
still a small auction, the threshold rises to 0.79. To provide a more intuitive characterization of
the same phenomenon, increases in the number of potential bidders produce small, and ever smaller,
increases in the expected number of active bidders,f r o m3=5( 0 .6) when N =5to 3.7=1 0( 0 .37)
when N =1 0 ,a n dt h e nt o4.2=2 0( 0 .21) when N =2 0 . In this particular case, in other words,
the addition of 15 more potential bidders caused the expected number of active bidders to increase
by little more than 1.
There are at least two senses in which the pattern is a robust one. First, while it is possible
to construct examples in which, over some short interval, the expected number of active bidders
falls as the number of potential bidders rises, in none of the cases represented in Table 1, or for
that matter Table 2, does this happen. Second, and to our initial surprise, for a ﬁxed participation
cost c, the relationship between auction size and the number of active bidders doesn’t vary much
with the distribution of private values. Consider, for example, the situation in which c =0 .05 and
N =1 0 . While the threshold value varies from 0.70 in the auction with few extreme bidders to, on
the one hand, 0.41 in the auction with low value bidders or, on the other hand, 0.94 in the auction
with high value bidders, the likelihoods of non-participation are, respectively, 0.75, 0.79 and 0.72,
consistent with 2.55, 2.08 and 2.78 active bidders. If the auction is then doubled in size, so that
N =2 0 , the expected numbers of active bidders become 2.71, 2.31 and 2.89.
Table 1 also hints, however, that both the threshold and expected number of active bidders will
be sensitive to the costs of participation. When there are 10 potential bidders whose private values
are drawn from the uniform distribution, for example, an increase in costs from 0.01 to 0.05 causes
14the threshold to rise, from 0.63 to 0.74, and the expected number of active bidders to fall, from 3.69
to 2.59. Curiously, perhaps, almost the same number (1.10) of active bidders are "lost" under other
distributions: 1.14 = 3.69−2.55 when the distribution is bell-shaped, 1.11 = 3.19−2.08 when it is
skewed to the left, and 1.16 = 3.94 − 2.78 when it is skewed to the right.
We know, from the previous section, that the participation threshold will be lower in second
price auctions, and the results in Table 2 provide some sense of the diﬀerence in practice. In the
extreme case of N =2potential bidders with low participation costs, there is no threshold at all.
That is, both bidders will participate, no matter what their private values. In fact, in auctions with
few(er) low value bidders, in particular when the distribution of private values is either F(v|2,2)or
F(v |5,1), the threshold is zero even when costs are 0.10. To understand this, recall that in the case
N =2-o r ,w i t hN>2 potential bidders, the sub-case M =2- the representative bidder knows
that she will either win the auction or determine what the winner pays and therefore the public
beneﬁts that accrue to both bidders. This is sometimes suﬃcient to induce low value bidders to
participate, despite the costs.
While full participation is a special feature of (some) "minimal" or N =2second price auctions,
the diﬀerence remains substantial as auction size increases. In the uniform case, the increase in the
threshold under either the ﬁrst price or all-pay mechanisms, from 0.10 to 0.79, for example, as the
number of potential bidders increases from 2 to 20 when costs are 0.01, stands in marked contrast
to the increase from 0 to 0.62 under the analogous second price mechanism. In an auction with 20
potential bidders, this is the equivalent of an almost 85% increase in the number of active bidders,
from 4.11 to 7.58. Nor is the size of this eﬀect an artifact of the choice of distribution function: for
the same auction size and participation costs, the numbers of expected bidders are 4.06 and 7.56
when the distribution is F(v|2,2), 3.60 and 7.18 when it is F(v |1,3),a n d4.27 and 7.74 when it is
F(v |5,1). I ns h o r t ,i nt h ea b s e n c eo fc o s td i ﬀerentials, it seems that second price auctions will be
more "active," and to the extent that this is a secondary objective for the charity, a point in their
favor.
Otherwise, the same broad patterns characterize participation across mechanisms. The expected
number of active bidders, for example, is not all that sensitive to the distribution of private values,
but is responsive to variations in cost. Under the bell-shaped distribution, for example, the expected
number of active bidders when N =2 0(7.56)a n dc o s t sa r e0.01 is almost identical to that under
the uniform (7.58), and not far from those in the left (7.18) and right-skewed (7.74) distributions,
but as costs rise to 0.05, the expected number of active bidders falls to 6.66.
153.3 Bid Functions
Consider, for comparison purposes, the familiar result that in a ﬁrst price auction without spillovers
or participation costs, bidders whose values are drawn from a uniform distribution will "shade" their
bids by an amount equal to (N
1 )th of their value, and bid N
N
−1v. T h i si sd e p i c t e d ,f o rN =1 5 ,a s
the solid line in the upper left panel in Figure 2a, in which various ﬁrst price bid functions have been
plotted. Relative to this benchmark, the introduction of revenue proportional beneﬁts (α =0 .25)
and warm glow (γ =0 .10), represented in the same panel by the dotted line, seems to function like
an ad valorem subsidy to bidders, an observation easily substantiated on the basis of (8): when
N−1 α+γN v=0and F(v)=v, σf(v) is equal, after some simpliﬁcation, to (1−γ)N−αv,o r(1−γ)N−α percent
more than was bid in their combined absence.
Under some conditions, the subsidy is suﬃcient to reverse bid shading. In the diagram, a bidder
whose private value is 1, for example, will bid 1.057; in general, σf(v) will exceed v under the
uniform distribution when α + γN > 1, an inequality that seems likely to be satisﬁed in most large
auctions. Furthermore, the subsidy is increasing in both the common return α and warm glow γ,
as expected, and decreasing in the number of potential bidders N.
The further addition of participation costs equal to 0.05 has dramatic eﬀects on the bid function,
as the dashed line in the same panel reveals. The behavior of bidders is now sharply nonlinear, for
example, and the reason is not just the introduction of a substantial threshold - indeed, to the extent
that bids are not zero, but undeﬁned, below the threshold, this is no reason at all - but instead the
pronounced concavity of the bid function above the threshold. Close to the threshold, bids increase
very rapidly and then level oﬀ, a feature with important econometric implications. As a result, the
eﬀect of participation costs on the value of the average bid, as opposed to the number of bidders, is
quite limited: a bidder who decides to participate knows that if others follow suit, their values must
(also) be quite high, and therefore bids aggressively. A bidder whose value is close to the maximum
(1), for example, bids almost as much as she would in the absence of participation costs.
The fourth and ﬁnal function plotted (as a series of dots and dashes) in the same panel is the
equilibrium bid function when the common return, warm glow and participation cost remain in
place, but the number of potential bidders is reduced to N =5 . It serves as a reminder that a
standard result on auction size and ﬁrst price bids - that bidders with more competitors are more
aggressive because they cannot aﬀord to shade their bids as much - doesn’t hold in this environment,
at least not for all values. In visual terms, the reason is that the smaller auction also has a lower
threshold, so that a bidder who is indiﬀerent about participation when N =1 5 ,a n dw h ow o u l d
16therefore submit a zero bid if she did participate, would ﬁnd it in her interest to submit a positive
bid when N =5 . For high value bidders, the "shading eﬀect" appears to dominate; for low(er), but
still above the second threshold, value bidders, the "participation eﬀect" does, another important
consideration in the estimation of bid functions.
The other panels in Figure 2a show the same four bid functions for the three alternative value
distributions, and suggest that these results are robust. Consider what is perhaps the least similar
case, the situation depicted in the lower left panel in which there is a preponderance of low value
bidders. It should come as no surprise that even in the standard case - that is, no common return,
no warm glow, and no costs of participation - bids are no longer proportional to values: because
(small) variations in private value do not have much eﬀect on the likelihood that a high value bidder
will win in this environment, bids are not adjusted much either. Furthermore, unlike the uniform
case, bidders never bid more than their values, at least for the parameter values considered here.
This said, the two panels share at least three important features. First, it still appears that in
the absence of participation costs, the introduction of a common return and warm glow have much
t h es a m ee ﬀect on bids as an ad valorem subsidy. Second, those with values close to the maximum
aren’t much aﬀected by participation costs or, in broader terms, the eﬀects of these costs on bid
behavior diminish with value. Third, with both shading and participation eﬀects at work, high and
low value bidders respond quite diﬀerently to an increase in auction size.
The characterization of second price bid functions is much less complicated. First and foremost,
the four panels in Figure 2b provide visual conﬁrmation that with the common return and warm
glow present, variations in the number of potential bidders N or participation costs c inﬂuence the
participation decision but not, conditional on participation, the bid itself. In eﬀect, there exists a
"one size ﬁts all" second price bid function that is "activated" for some combinations of N and c
but not others. In the uniform case depicted in the upper left panel, for example, a bidder with
private value 0.30 will bid 0.502 when α =0 .25 and γ =0 .10 when costs c are zero, but not bid (as
opposed to a bid of zero) when costs are 0.05, but another bidder with a value just 0.01 higher will
bid 0.511 in both situations.
Furthermore, consistent with intuition, this one size ﬁts all bid function diﬀers across distributions
but in all cases reﬂects some inﬂation of bids relative to the standard auction, in which it is dominant
to bid one’s value, no matter what the distribution of values. This inﬂation no longer resembles
an ad valorem subsidy, however, as it did in ﬁrst price auctions. Under a uniform distribution,
for example, the diﬀerence declines not just in proportional, but absolute, terms as value increases,
from 0.242(= 0.242−0.00) when v =0to 0.11(= 1.11−1.00) when v =1 . The same is true when
17the distribution of values is either hump shaped or skewed to the right, but not when it is skewed
left, when the diﬀerence increases from 0.094 when v =0to 0.111 when v =1 .S i n c e t h e d i ﬀerence
between standard and charity-inﬂated second price bids does not vary much across distributions for
high value bidders - indeed, is the same for bidders with v =1- the explanation is found in the
diﬀerences for low value bidders.
Consider, for example, second price auctions with a preponderance of high value bidders which,
as illustrated in the lower right panel of Figure 2b, produces the largest diﬀerence in the behavior of
low value bidders: a bidder whose value is close to zero will bid almost nothing, for example, in the
absence of common return and warm glow, but more than 0.75 in their presence. The intuition is
that in the (expected) presence of many high value bidders, the beneﬁts to low value bidders of an
inﬂated bid - in particular, the possible increase in the "second price" and therefore auction revenues
a n dc o m m o nr e t u r n-e x c e e dt h ec o s t so fa ni m p r o b a b l e" w i n . "
Casual inspection of the all-pay bid functions in Figure 2c suggests that the eﬀects of participation
costs are less pronounced than in either ﬁrst or second price auctions. To illustrate with the familiar
uniform case, consider the behavior of the median potential bidder, someone with v =0 .50.S i n c e
the ﬁrst price and all-pay thresholds are the same, we know that such a bidder will not participate
in the charity auction when there are N =1 5potential bidders and costs are 0.05.E v e n w h e n
participation is costless, however, the optimal bid is less than one one hundredth of one percent of
her value or, to be more precise, 4.38 × 10−5, which is itself a substantial (in proportional terms,
that is) inﬂation of the optimal bid in a standard auction, 2.85 × 10−5.
For some, if not most, econometric purposes, the diﬀerence between a bid, however small, and
no bid at all is all that matters, but it is not clear whether someone whose optimal bid is close to
0 will - or, faced with the indivisibilities that constrain bidders in most real world auctions, even
could - participate. This in turn has important, if still unexplored, consequences for other bidders.
The uniform case also exhibits the predictable bid inﬂa t i o na s s o c i a t e dw i t hc h a r i t ya u c t i o n s ,o n e
that, in this case, increases in absolute, but decreases in relative, terms. It also demonstrates that
the common view that increased competition restrains bidders when bids are forfeit does not hold in
the presence of participation costs. (In fact, it doesn’t hold in their absence, either: from (36), the





βvN, the value of which must (only)
eventually decline in N.) In this case, the upper left panel of Figure 2c reveals that high value
bidders, at least, are more aggressive when N =1 5than N =5 . In broader terms, the diﬀerence
in thresholds causes the bid functions to cross once, a pattern reminiscent of ﬁrst price auctions:
for low(er) values in their common domain, bids are smaller with N =1 5than N =5 , while the
18opposite is true for high(er) values.
Unlike the ﬁrst price auction, however, even the behavior of very high value bidders is sensitive
to the existence of participation costs. The so-called "maximal bidder" will bid 1.36 in a charity
auction with participation costs of 0.05, and 1.44 in the same auction without such costs.
All of these features are robust with respect to the distribution of private values, or at least the
four distributions considered here.
Finally, Figure 3 allows for the comparison of bid functions across mechanisms and distributions
in the special, if now familiar, case of N =1 5potential bidders, participation costs c =0 .05,
common return α =0 .25 and warm glow γ =0 .10. The surprise, perhaps, is how little can be said
about the relative sizes of bids across mechanisms. One obvious exception is that for all values in
their common domain, second price bidders bid strictly more than their ﬁrst price counterparts, a
result that carries over from standard auctions. It is not even the case that both are always more
aggressive than those who must forfeit their bids under the all-pay format; in fact, for three of the
four distributions pictured here, those with very high values will bid more in all-pay than either ﬁrst
or second price auctions. The intuition for this is that with revenue proportional beneﬁts, such
bidders are, in eﬀect, subsidized by their rivals. This is consistent with the observation that the
exception is the distribution associated with a preponderance of low value bidders, depicted in the
lower left panel: under these conditions, the common return is never suﬃcient to rationalize bids
well in excess of private values.
This said, under all four distributions, all-pay bids are smallest for low(er) value bidders, and
remain so over much of the common domain before surpassing (at least) ﬁrst price bids, a consequence
of the fact that all-pay bidders forfeit their bids, no matter what the outcome of the auction.
3.4 Revenue Functions
Our principal interest here are not the bid function itself, but their revenue implications. To this
end, consider Figure 4a, which plots the variation in expected revenue as a function of auction size
(N) across both distributions and mechanisms. Its most obvious feature is that in every case,
revenue rises, at a diminishing rate, with the number of potential bidders. Because this is not
inevitable - recall that Menezes and Monterio (2000) ﬁnd that participation costs cause revenues to
rise and then fall in the absence of a common return - the result serves to cast doubt on the practical
signiﬁcance of such anomalies.
Furthermore, with the limited exception of the F(v|1,3) distribution, expected revenue more
or less levels oﬀ after the ﬁrst dozen or so potential bidders. A similar pattern characterizes the
19standard auction, but the explanation is a little diﬀerent: in the standard case, the ﬁrst order
statistic for private values is a concave function of the number of bidders with an upper limit of 1,
the upper bound of the distribution of values, but in charity auctions with endogenous participation,
this is ampliﬁed by the fact that as auction size increases, the number of active bidders also increases
at an ever diminishing rate. The map from potential to active bidders also helps to explain the fact
that revenues in the low value F(v|1,3) auction do not level oﬀ as soon: as a review of Tables 1
and 2 reveals, there are fewer active bidders, ceteris paribus,i nt h i se n v i r o n m e n t .
Some will be surprised that even with N =4 0potential bidders, the ﬁrst and second price
mechanisms produce such diﬀerent revenue. The problem is that here, too, intuition is based on the
case of compact distributions and costless participation. From (8) and (23), it follows that in both
cases, the winner’s payment, and therefore auction revenue, are equal to σf(1) = σs(1) = (1−γ)−1,
no matter what the distribution of values.
This leads us to broader conclusions about the relative performance of mechanisms. Figure 4a
suggests that at least two inequalities are robust with respect to the distribution of private values:
for any number of potential bidders N, both the second price and all pay formats "revenue dominate"
their ﬁrst price equivalent. Both inequalities are consistent with previous results for auctions with
a ﬁxed number of active bidders (that is, costless participation) and have the same intuition.
The response of the second price/all pay revenue diﬀerential to variations in the number of
potential bidders is more complicated, but not much so. Under all four distributions, the all pay
mechanism eventually produces more revenue, in expectation, than its second price equivalent. For
auctions with either a uniform or bell-shaped distribution of values, it happens almost at once - that
is, when there are 3 or more potential bidders - and for the auction with a preponderance of high
value bidders, it holds even in the limiting case N =2 . It is only when there is a preponderance
of low value bidders that the second price mechanism does better in auctions of intermediate size
(under the assumed parameter values, N less than 30). To understand this, recall that with so
many low value bidders, high value bidders aren’t subsidized enough to bid very aggressively.
Figure 4b, which depicts the relationship(s) between expected revenue and participation costs
for auctions with N =1 0potential bidders, leads to some important, if unexpected, conclusions.
Consistent with intuition, revenues decline as participation costs rise, across both distributions and
auction formats. In the case of second price auctions, however, the decline is almost imperceptible:
if private values are uniformly distributed, for example, expected revenue declines from 0.953 when
c =0to 0.937 when c =0 .15,o r30 percent of the median value. From an operational perspective,
charities that do not know what it costs to participate in their auctions will sometimes ﬁnd that
20the second price mechanism serves them best, despite the results in Figure 3a. To understand this,
recall that in second price auctions, cost inﬂuences the decision to participate but not, conditional
on participation, the bid itself.
The fact that the all pay mechanism is (much) more cost sensitive than the second price leads to
an important reversal: consistent with intuition, the all pay format is more lucrative for charities
when there are no, or even few, obstacles to participation, but as participation becomes more
diﬃcult, the premium shrinks and is eventually reversed. Both, however, do better than the ﬁrst
price mechanism no matter what the costs of participation.
4C o n c l u s i o n
T h em o d e ld e s c r i b e di nt h i sp a p e rp r o v i d e saﬁrst framework for the study of charity auctions with
endogenous participation. At the cost of a smaller number of hard and fast rules, it can explain
what some researchers have observed in the ﬁeld and introduce some new considerations into the
choice of mechanism.
For example, to return to one of the questions that motivated this paper, namely, is the mere
existence of participation costs suﬃcient to explain the underperformance of the all-pay mechanism
reported in Carpenter, Holmes and Matthews (2006)? The short answer is no. Consider, for exam-
ple, the variation in participation rates across mechanisms, and recall that in this ﬁeld experiment,
more bidders were "active" under the ﬁrst price mechanism than either the second price or all-pay
a mechanisms, which implies that vf < vs <v . If the obstacles to participation are not mechanism-
speciﬁc, so that cf = cs = ca, the model instead predicts that participation rates in second price
auctions will exceed those in either ﬁrst price or all-pay auctions, or vs <v f = va.U n d e r t h e
maintained assumptions of the model, this requires, at a minimum, that the costs of participation
in a ﬁrst price auction cf be smaller than either alternative. Without additional information, the
participation data cannot pin down the relationship between cs and ca, however: more bidders will
participate in second price auctions even if it costs a little more to do so.
The revenue data support, perhaps even reﬁne, these conclusions. Carpenter, Holmes and
Matthews (2006) found that in the ﬁeld, the ﬁrst price mechanism produced more revenue than either
the second price or all-pay mechanisms, which in turn were more or less "revenue equivalent," or Rf >
Rs ≈ Ra. Further examination of Figure 3b suggests, however, that within the framework of the
model, this outcome is not just inconsistent with constant (across mechanism) costs of participation,
a a but implies that cf is less than both cs and c . Once more, the relationship between cs and c seems
21elusive, but it is also reasonable to infer that the two mechanisms would not produce the same revenue
under diﬀerent circumstances unless cs <c a, that is, unless it cost bidders more to participate in an
all-pay auction.
We ﬁnd support for this in some preliminary survey data. In lab experiments conducted by
Carpenter, Holmes and Matthews (2007), participants were askeds to assess the fairness and com-
plexity of diﬀerent mechanisms on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 represented least fair and easiest to
comprehend, respectively. The results suggest that the all-pay format was perceived as signiﬁcantly
less fair (mean =1 .97)t h a nt h eE n g l i s ha u c t i o n( m e a n=4 .0), the silent auction (mean =3 .77)a n d
the raﬄe( m e a n=3 .54)a n ds i g n i ﬁcantly more diﬃcult to understand (mean =2 .07)t h a nb o t ht h e
English (mean =4 .0)a n ds i l e n t( m e a n=1 .58)a u c t i o n sa n dt h er a ﬄe( m e a n=1 .28).
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23 Participation Cost = 0.01  Participation Cost = 0.05  Participation Cost = 0.10 
Threshold  Share of Inactive  Threshold  Share of Inactive  Threshold  Share of Inactive 
Value  Bidders  Value  Bidders  Value  Bidders 
(1,1) N=2  0.10  0.10  0.22  0.22  0.32  0.32 
N=5  0.40  0.40  0.55  0.55  0.63  0.63 
N=10  0.63  0.63  0.74  0.74  0.79  0.79 
N=20  0.79  0.79  0.86  0.86  0.89  0.89 
(2,2) N=2  0.17  0.06  0.30  0.17  0.38  0.26 
N=5  0.46  0.38  0.57  0.54  0.63  0.63 
N=10  0.63  0.63  0.70  0.75  0.74  0.80 
N=20  0.74  0.80  0.79  0.86  0.82  0.90 
(1,3) N=2  0.06  0.17  0.14  0.36  0.20  0.49 
N=5  0.19  0.48  0.29  0.64  0.35  0.73 
N=10  0.32  0.68  0.41  0.79  0.46  0.84 
N=20  0.44  0.82  0.51  0.88  0.56  0.91 
(5,1) N=2  0.46  0.02  0.61  0.08  0.68  0.15 
N=5  0.80  0.33  0.87  0.49  0.90  0.58 
N=10  0.90  0.61  0.94  0.72  0.95  0.78 
N=20  0.95  0.79  0.97  0.86  0.98  0.89 
Table 1.  Threshold Values and Non-Participation Rates Under The FP and AP Mechanisms 
This table reports the threshold value and share of bidders who are inactive under either the FP or AP mechanism 
for various numbers of potential bidders and participation costs under uniform (1,1), hump-shaped (2,2), left-skewed 
(1,3) and right-skewed (5,1) distributions of private values.  Participation Cost = 0.01  Participation Cost = 0.05  Participation Cost = 0.10 
Threshold  Share of Inactive  Threshold  Share of Inactive  Threshold  Share of Inactive 
Value  Bidders  Value  Bidders  Value  Bidders 
(1,1)  N=2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.04  0.04 
N=5  0.21  0.21  0.30  0.30  0.35  0.35 
N=10  0.44  0.44  0.51  0.51  0.54  0.54 
N=20  0.62  0.62  0.67  0.67  0.69  0.69 
(2,2)  N=2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00 
N=5  0.32  0.20  0.40  0.29  0.44  0.34 
N=10  0.50  0.43  0.55  0.51  0.57  0.54 
N=20  0.62  0.62  0.65  0.67  0.66  0.69 
(1,3)  N=2  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.08  0.06  0.18 
N=5  0.10  0.26  0.14  0.37  0.17  0.42 
N=10  0.19  0.47  0.23  0.54  0.25  0.57 
N=20  0.29  0.64  0.32  0.69  0.33  0.70 
(5,1)  N=2  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
N=5  0.70  0.16  0.76  0.25  0.79  0.30 
N=10  0.84  0.41  0.87  0.49  0.88  0.52 
N=20  0.91  0.61  0.92  0.66  0.93  0.68 
Table 2.  Threshold Values and Non-Participation Rates Under The SP Mechanism 
This table reports the threshold value and share of bidders who are inactive under either the SP mechanism (a=0.25,b=0.35) 
for various numbers of potential bidders and participation costs under uniform (1,1), hump-shaped (2,2), left-skewed (1,3) 
and right-skewed (5,1) distributions of private values. Figure 1.  Kumuraswamy Density Functions 
Legend: Solid: a=1, b=1. Dotted: a=2, b=2.  Dashed:  a=1, b=3 
Dotted/Dashed:  a=5, b=1 Figure 2a.  Optimal Bids in FP Auctions As A Function of Private Value
Under Uniform (1,1), Hump-Shaped (2,2), Left-Skewed (1,3) and
Right-Skewed (5,1) Distributions.
Legend: Solid:  α = 0, β = 0, c = 0, N = 15 
Dotted:  α = 0.25, β = 0.35, c = 0, N = 15 
Dashed:  α = 0.25, β = 0.35, c = 0.05, N = 15 
Dotted/Dashed:  α = 0.25, β = 0.35, c = 0.05, N = 5 Figure 2b.  Optimal Bids in SP Auctions As A Function of Private Value
Under Uniform (1,1), Hump-Shaped (2,2), Left-Skewed (1,3) and
Right-Skewed (5,1) Distributions.
Legend: Solid:  α = 0, β = 0, c = 0, N = 15 
Dotted:  α = 0.25, β = 0.35, c = 0, N = 15 
Dashed:  α = 0.25, β = 0.35, c = 0.05, N = 15 
Dotted/Dashed:  α = 0.25, β = 0.35, c = 0.05, N = 5 Figure 2c.  Optimal Bids in AP Auctions As A Function of Private Value
Under Uniform (1,1), Hump-Shaped (2,2), Left-Skewed (1,3) and
Right-Skewed (5,1) Distributions.
Legend: Solid:  α = 0, β = 0, c = 0, N = 15 
Dotted:  α = 0.25, β = 0.35, c = 0, N = 15 
Dashed:  α = 0.25, β = 0.35, c = 0.05, N = 15 
Dotted/Dashed:  α = 0.25, β = 0.35, c = 0.05, N = 5 Figure 3.  Optimal Bids in FP, SP and AP Auctions Under Uniform (1,1),
Hump-Shaped (2,2), Left-Skewed (1,3) and
Right-Skewed (5,1) Distributions.
Legend: Solid:  FP, α = 0.25, β = 0.35, c = 0.05, N = 15 
Dotted:  SP, α = 0.25, β = 0.35, c = 0.05, N = 15 
Dashed:  AP, α = 0.25, β = 0.35, c = 0.05, N = 15   
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Figure 4a.  Expected Revenue as a Function of the Number of Potential Bidders, α=0.25, β=0.35 and c = 0.05 
Legend:   Solid Line - FP  Dashed Line - SP  Dotted Line - AP   
The (1,1) Case  The (2,2) Case 
1.400  1.4 
1.200  1.2 
1.000  1 
0.800  0.8 






0.000  0.010  0.020  0.030  0.040  0.050  0.060  0.070  0.080  0.090  0.100  0.110  0.120  0.130  0.140  0.150 
0 
0.000  0.010  0.020  0.030  0.040  0.050  0.060  0.070  0.080  0.090  0.100  0.110  0.120  0.130  0.140  0.150 
The (1,3) Case  The (5,1) Case 
0.8  1.600 
0.7 
1.400 
0.6  1.200 
0.5 
1.000 









0.000  0.010  0.020  0.030  0.040  0.050  0.060  0.070  0.080  0.090  0.100  0.110  0.120  0.130  0.140  0.150 
0.000  0.010  0.020  0.030  0.040  0.050  0.060  0.070  0.080  0.090  0.100  0.110  0.120  0.130  0.140  0.150 
Figure 4b.  Expected Revenue as a Function of Participation Cost, α=0.25, β=0.35 and N=10
Legend:   Solid Line - FP  Dashed Line - SP  Dotted Line - AP